Meyerdecision in Piercev. Society of

making a decision regarding which embryo to carry to term (Brownsword, 310). These technologies are largely legally unrestricted barring some safety regulations. Genome editing, though it differs in means, offers similar functions in terms of allowing parents to prevent harmful genetic traits regarding health from developing in newborns. Thus it is likely that as genome editing technologies continue to emerge and become more prevalent to the public they would be treated by the language of the law in a similar manner to current genetic testing technologies, a tool to be taken advantage of by parents due to their right to parental autonomy (Ossareh, 730).

This isn't to say that there would be no attempt to curtail legal access or an attempt to regulate in some capacity genome-editing technologies on either the state or federal level. As society adjusts to the availability of a new technology it will have a period of uncertainty in how it should regard it in the language of legality. But based on historic precedents and how present genetic technologies are regarded in the purview of reproductive rights, the treatment of gene-editing technologies would largely be that of free access and left to discretion of up and coming parents as due by their legal autonomy.

Part 2: Ethical Blindspots and Eugenicel Implications

Yet the linguistics of law and the language of ethics, though occasionally correlated, are not one-to-one. The legal right to parental autonomy doesn't begin to address the potential implications such emerging gene-editing technologies may have. Current gene screening

technologies involved in reproductive care such as PGD allow patients whom chosen method of implantation is IVF to select the sex of their embryo, a crucial aspect in the biological development of any child (Ossareh, 741). Yet the possibilities offered by emergent gene-editing technologies makes such a choice seem quaint in comparison. Gene-editing technologies will not only allow parents to make therapeutic adjustments to their future children as part of a medical treatment, though as shown later even this aspect is prone to moral quandaries, but select children with particular aesthetic and non-medical traits according to their own whims and desires. This selection by parents of perceived positive and beneficial traits via excising perceived negative and harmful traits in an effort to improve the person that might become their child plays into a sense of biological determinism: that genetic traits, above all else, decide a person's livelihood in all its aspects (Mathews, 733). Specifically it's a determinism that has historically informed various eugenics proposals, and it is this dubious idealogical relation that is most important as we shape the language of discourse around emergent gene-editing technologies.

Eugenics, if it can be concisely defined, is the belief that reproductive strategies can be used to improve a population in the capacity the believer sees fit (Roberts, 790). Though this brief definition fails to acknowledge the historical context in which these eugenics proposals appeared. Historically, "improve the population" meant reducing the births of socially marginalized people. In the United States, this took the form of multiple statutes in the early twentieth century such as the 1907 and 1924 sterilization acts in Indiana and Virginia respectively (Roberts, 790). These two laws allowed for criminal populations, disproportionally African-American and those confined to mental institutions to be subject to compulsory sterilization if the corresponding authorities saw fit to do so (Roberts, 791). Similar acts we

adopted through-out the U.S. up until the aftermath of World War 2 where the state would sanction, frankly, racially and mental-normally charged population control measures that further marginalized these groups (Roberts, 791).

It is here where the comparison between these eugenicel acts of the past and the potential usage of these new gene-editing technologies is not entirely one-to-one, as noted by figures such as British sociologist Nickolas Rose. The acts fuel by eugenics in the early twentieth century were a bio-political strategy that sought to use deliberate state action as a means of population control (Handwerker, 117). The usage of both contemporary PGD and emergent gene-editing technologies, however, are not legally compulsory. It up to parental discretion how and to what extent these technologies serve as part of a reproductive selection process (Handwerker, 118). The onus is then on the parent, motivated by a desire for self-fulfillment and the wish for the best life of their child, to make these genetic changes. Instead of a politics of marginalization, Sociologists such as Rose claim that it is "a bio-politics concern with the genetic health of individuals" (Handwerker, 119).

While the distinctions scholars like Nickolas Rose make between eugenics proposals of the early twentieth century and the likely contemporary usage of new gene-editing technologies are important to acknowledge, to what extent they separate the selection these technologies instill from eugenics is still questionable. Yes, the onus has been privatized to an individual's decision, but it doesn't necessarily follow that the endpoint has been changed. At the core of eugenics thought is the attributing of social inequities to reproduction and genetic traits rather than social structure. If parental decisions regarding their child's genetic are made under this pretense it is still a form of eugenics, just on a micro-level rather than on a macro-scale.

With this in mind, let’s approach the usage of genetic technologies for medically therapeutic reasons. These technologies seek to alleviate genetic abnormalities such as those associated with Down syndrome and cystic fibrosis. While at first glance this is ttetic

about the option to preform a selective abortion or discard an genetically abnormal embryo. For example, a survey done by Dr. Brian Stotko reported that many of the 985 participants who received pre-natal diagnosis of Down syndrome for their children were chastised by health care professionals for not making the decision to abort (Roberts, 785). Furthermore, there is a need to bridge the gap between lay people's perspectives on emergent gene-editing technologies and the viewpoints of experts feverishly working on making these technologies possible. Often lay people are less aware of the mechanics of gene editing and often express concerns over how such technology are used. A focus study preformed by Ian Barns found that the participants, while not out right rejecting the possibilities of gene-editing technologies, nevertheless expressed some concerns; specifically in areas involving what traits are targeted for editing and the motivation behind such decisions (Barns, 290).

Developments are already taking shape into guiding the shape of this discourse in a way to avoid the eugenicel implications and the divide between the public and experts understanding of these emergent genetic technologies. An experiment preformed by Robyn Shaw explored avenues on facilitating discussions between interested lay people and experiments. With the use of a community consultation workshop they were able to craft a forum in which lay people can express their questions and concerns to experts and they in turn sought to address them (Schibeci, 338). Granted that workshops such as these are limited in their scope and aftermath; the model nevertheless proved useful as a proactive tool in establishing communication between the scientific and medical communities and the larger set of public interests (Schibeci, 338). It also has proved to be an effective tool in the process of policy formulation as seen in the review period of the Western Australian Reproductive Technologies Act in 1998 (Schibeci, 338). Meanwhile genetic counselors, though they might differ in practice, are technically under oath to

be non-directive in the treatments of their patients. The key in this is to frame the discussion of innate disability not just in the form of the choice to discard or not but rather attach to the latter options resources, both

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